Evidence of election fraud for 2004 is well established.
So what chance is there of a fair 2006 election?
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How to steal the next election
using the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine or others like it Rev. Bill
McGinnis | September 15 2006
Researchers at Princeton University have released a new "Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine," which finds many possibilities for election fraud in these particular voting machines. Their report also recognizes that similar problems likely exist with other direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines, saying, "Simply put, many computer scientists doubt that paperless DREs can be made reliable and secure, and they expect that any failures of such systems would likely go undetected." Here is a direct quotation from this report, describing some of the ways by which the next election could be stolen (most footnotes removed) . . . 2.2 Injecting Attack Code "To carry out these attacks, the attacker must somehow install his malicious software on one or more voting machines. If he can get physical access to a machine for as little as one minute, he can install the software manually. The attacker can also install a voting machine virus that spreads to other machines, allowing him to commit widespread fraud even if he only has physical access to one machine or memory card." 2.2.1 Direct Installation "An attacker with physical access to a machine would have least three methods of installing malicious software. The first is to create an EPROM chip containing a program that will install the attack code into the machine's flash memory, and then to open the machine, install the chip on its motherboard, and reboot from the EPROM. "The second method is to exploit a back door feature in Diebold's code to manually install the attack files from a memory card. When the machine boots, it checks whether a file named explorer.glb exists on the removable memory card. If such a file is present, the machine boots into Windows Explorer rather than Diebold's BallotStation election software. An attacker could insert a memory card containing this file, reboot the machine, and then use Explorer to copy the attack files onto the machine or run them directly from the card. "The third method exploits a service feature of the machine's bootloader. On startup, the machine checks the removable memory card for a file named fboot.nb0. If this file exists, the machine replaces the bootloader code in its onboard flash memory with the file's contents. An attacker could program a malicious bootloader, store it on a memory card as fboot.nb0, and reboot the machine with this card inserted, causing the Diebold bootloader to install the malicious software. (A similar method would create a malicious operating system image.) "The first method requires the attacker to remove several screws and lift off the top of the machine to get access to the motherboard and EPROM. The other methods only require access to the memory card slot and power button, which are both behind a locked door on the side of the machine. The lock is easily picked -- one member of our group, who has modest locksmithing skills, can pick the lock consistently in less than 10 seconds. Alternatively, this slot can be reached by removing screws and opening the machine. Some attackers will have access to keys that can open the lock -- all AccuVote-TS machines in certain states use identical keys, there are thousands of keys in existence, and these keys can be copied at a hardware or lock store. "A poll worker, election official, technician, or other person who had private access to a machine for as little as one minute could use these methods without detection. Poll workers often do have such access; for instance, in a widespread practice called 'sleepovers,' machines are sent home with poll workers the night before the election." 2.2.2 Voting Machine Viruses "Rather than injecting code into each machine directly, an attacker could create a computer virus that would spread from one voting machine to another. Once installed on a single 'seed' machine, the virus would spread to other machines by methods described below, allowing an attacker with physical access to one machine (or card) to infect a potentially large population of machines. The virus could be programmed to install malicious software, such as a vote-stealing program or denial-of-service attack, on every machine it infected. "When the machine is rebooted, it normally emits a musical chime that might be noticed during a stealth attack; but this sound can be suppressed by plugging headphones (or just a headphone connector) into the machine's headphone jack. "To prove that this is possible, we constructed a demonstration virus that spreads itself automatically from machine to machine, installing our demonstration vote-stealing software on each infected system. Our demonstration virus, described in Section 4.3, can infect machines and memory cards. An infected machine will infect any memory card that is inserted into it. An infected memory card will infect any machine that is powered up or rebooted with the memory card inserted. Because cards are transferred between machines during vote counting and administrative activities, the infected population will grow over time. "Diebold delivers software upgrades to the machines via memory cards: a technician inserts a memory card containing the updated code and then reboots the machine, causing the bootloader to install the new code from the memory card. This upgrade method relies on the correct functioning of the machine's bootloader, which is supposed to copy the upgraded code from the memory card into the machine's flash memory. But if the bootloader were already infected by a virus, then the virus could make the bootloader behave differently. For example, the bootloader could pretend to install the updates as expected but instead secretly propagate the virus onto the memory card. If the technician later used the same memory card to 'upgrade' other machines, he would in fact be installing the virus on them. Our demonstration virus illustrates these spreading techniques. "Memory cards are also transferred between machines in the process of transmitting election definition files to voting machines before an election. According to Diebold, 'Data is downloaded onto the [memory] cards using a few [AccuVote] units, and then the stacks of [memory] cards are inserted into the thousands of [AccuVote] terminals to be sent to the polling places.' "If one of the few units that download the data is infected, it will transfer the infection via the 'stacks of [memory] cards' into many voting machines." You can download a complete copy of this report in PDF format by clicking here. You can visit the report's main website at itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting. Blessings to you. May God help us all.
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Very weird result in the CT race. Lamont loses with EXACT number that republican
did in 2000
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Howard Dean Says No Impeachment Of
Bush
Howard Dean last night said there would be no impeachment proceedings against President Bush under a Democrat controlled Congress, echoing the pledge of Nancy Pelosi to protect the administration that lied a nation into a war and dismantled the very fabric of America. |
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Election 2004 Vote Fraud
Kerry conceded rapidly despite the fact that vote fraud has been documented everywhere. Numerous examples of vote fraud are pouring in. Election 2004 Vote Fraud: Alex Jones Interviews Bev Harris Post Election Analysis: Alex Jones Interviews Dr. Dennis Cuddy
Enter, Mr. Blackwell: Was He Bush's Trump Card In Ohio? It was Blackwell who supposedly told Andy Card that there were not enough provisional ballots on tap to make up the difference between Kerry's count and a possible victory for Kerry. In other words, no need to actually tally those provisional ballots. Staged Election: Several Republicans Win by Exact Same Amount of Votes What went wrong in Cuyahoga?- Did they count 90.000 votes in time? At around 1:00 AM this morning, we reported, that the Mayor of Columbus, Ohio, which is Michael B. Coleman, reported, that though Bush is leading with 100.000 votes, 190.000 Kerry Votes are "coming now from Cuyahoga".
Exit polls and ‘actual’ results don’t match; Evoting states show
greater discrepancy
An analysis of the original AP exit polling, which showed Kerry with a tighter margin and leading in myriad states, raises serious questions about the authenticity of the popular vote in several key states, RAW STORY has learned. Possible evidence of voter fraud in Ohio Note the already-voted-with ballots in the back of the truck with the Bush-Cheney sticker in the back window. Does this prove fraud? Well, it certainly doesn't look good in a state that's already had lots of problems this election. Fixed - The Stealing Of Another Election ...on several swing states, and EVERY STATE that
has EVoting but no paper trails has an unexplained advantage for
Bush of around +5% when comparing exit polls to actual results. Flashback: Diebold CEO in Ohio 'Committed to Delivering Election to Bush' The head of a company vying to sell voting machines in Ohio told Republicans in a recent fund-raising letter that he is "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year." Russian Observer Shocked by U.S. Election Procedures A Russian parliamentarian taking part in international monitoring of the U.S. presidential elections has said that the elections were held in violation of U.S. law and that that he was shocked after seeing how the elections were held. Electronic voting machine woes reported U.S. voters nationwide reported some 1,100 problems with electronic voting machines on Tuesday, including trouble choosing their intended candidates. More Evidence of Voting Machine Errors The screen says "Vote Save Error #9. Use the Backup Voting Procedure." A news crew was on hand to film Californians using the voting machines. I pointed to this particular screen and said "There's your story - right there. Bush wins Colorado, 41-34 percent, except election hasn’t started yet! President Bush has scored a resounding victory in Colorado, winning the popular vote 41 to 34 percent over Massachusetts senator John Kerry – at least according to the Rocky Mountain News, which posted the ‘final’ election results sometime Monday afternoon. TV Station Posts 'Test Report' Saying Bush Wins Presidency WBAY TV in Green Bay, Wisconsin ran an AP article reporting that Bush has won the election, weeks before the election is to take place. More vote fraud on our election night page Electronic Voting Machine fraud page
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Counties warned of security glitch in Diebold machines
Friday, May 12, 2006
By Jerome L. Sherman, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Pennsylvania election officials are urging some counties to take added safety measures before Tuesday's primary because one touch-screen voting machine model contains a security vulnerability that could lead to fraud.
The machine, Diebold Election System's AccuVote-TSX, is being used by 16 counties, including five in Western Pennsylvania: Armstrong, Clarion, Somerset, Warren and Washington.
According to election officials, a computer expert with unfettered access to the ATM-like machine could, in theory, change its software with relative ease and potentially alter election results.
"It's an awful flaw. But it's easy to fix," said Michael Shamos, a Carnegie Mellon University computer science professor who tests voting machines for the state.
Secretary of State Pedro A. Cortes, who oversees elections in Pennsylvania, sent a directive May 2 to counties using the Diebold machines, telling local elections departments to reinstall authorized software on each TSX and keep the units locked up, a step normally taken by every county.
Mr. Cortes described the probability of a security breach as "low," and his directive said Diebold would correct the flaw.
David Bear, a Diebold spokesman, said the North Canton, Ohio-based company plans to adjust the machines so they can more easily recognize unauthorized software.
But he defended the security of the machines in their current design, saying any tampering would require the cooperation of "corrupt" election officials.
The trustworthiness of the nation's election systems has been under intense scrutiny since Florida's botched 2000 presidential elections, which prompted Congress to enact the Help America Vote Act.
The law, known as HAVA, is forcing local governments across the country to buy new voting machines this year.
Diebold has been a leading supplier of new equipment. Allegheny County officials had considered buying the TSX before they eventually settled on another touch-screen machine, Election Systems & Software's iVotronic.
The Diebold flaw was discovered earlier this year by a researcher for Black Box Voting, a nonprofit organization in Washington state that closely follows computer security issues in electronic voting.
The organization contacted Dr. Shamos and he confirmed the problems, which, he said, could not have been detected by the normal certification process in Pennsylvania.
California and Iowa have since followed the state's lead in calling on local election departments to take additional precautions with their Diebold machines.
Yesterday, Black Box Voting released a new report, completed with the help of a Finnish computer expert, that says Diebold's equipment contains even deeper flaws.
"Someone could have gone in at any point in the machine's life and put something in there to alter votes. It's a permanent contamination," said Bev Harris, director and founder of Black Box Voting. "Diebold needs to pull them off the shelf and redesign them."
To date, there has been no proof of wrongdoing, but Ms. Harris said undetected tampering could take place.
Mr. Bear said groups like Black Box Voting are trying to "confuse or frighten" voters.
"This system has been more thoroughly reviewed than any system in the country," he said.
Dr. Shamos said Pennsylvania is addressing concerns raised by Ms. Harris' organization. He said someone with considerable knowledge of Diebold's computer systems could install dangerous software, but gaining access would be very difficult if local election officials follow normal security procedures.
Ronn Kuzmovich, director of elections for Clarion County, said his office performed new "logic and accuracy" tests on the county's 120 Diebold machines and then locked them away.
In Somerset County, officials reinstalled software in 234 machines. Tina Pritts, director of voter registration and elections in the county, said she didn't have any concerns about using Diebold equipment, while Mr. Kuzmovich said the company's service has been "outstanding."
- Keeping the software secret claiming it is proprietary, which is nonsense. There is only one legitimate way to count votes. That makes it easy for Diebold or anyone else to hide fraud subroutines in the code. No one, not even the election officials are allowed to examine the computer program inside each voting machine for evidence of tampering.
No paper audit trail.
No sealing mechanism to freeze the software inside each voting machine. It can be changed remotely at any time.
Only one set of computers accumulate and tally the vote. They can be easily hacked and compromised, or fiddled with a hidden back door. Everyone who has ever had a virus on their computer knows how easy this is to do. It is even easier with physical access. Anyone who wants to should be allowed to tally the vote with their computers.
No inspection, audit or freezing of the software used in the Diebold accumulation computers.
Diebold has announced they will "do everything possible" to ensure a Bush win. At least they are honest about their intent to commit fraud.
- Diebold has already been caught fudging an election in Georgia.
Fraud software can add just the minimum number of votes to tip the balance. The very existence of near tie elections is evidence of vote tampering. Statistically they should be rare.
"It is enough that the people know there was an election. The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything."
~ Josef Stalin
If there IS any voter fraud, who should we 'count on' to know about it?
Observers will be part of OSCE's human rights office
From David de Sola, CNN
Monday, August 9, 2004
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- A team of international observers will monitor the
presidential election in November, according to the U.S. State Department.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was invited to monitor
the election by the State Department. The observers will come from the OSCE's
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
It will be the first time such a team has been present for a U.S. presidential
election.
"The U.S. is obliged to invite us, as all OSCE countries should," spokeswoman
Urdur Gunnarsdottir said. "It's not legally binding, but it's a political
commitment. They signed a document 10 years ago to ask OSCE to observe
elections."
Thirteen Democratic members of the House of Representatives, raising the
specter of possible civil rights violations that they said took place in
Florida and elsewhere in the 2000 election, wrote to U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan in July, asking him to send observers.
After Annan rejected their request, saying the administration must make the
application, the Democrats asked Secretary of State Colin Powell to do so.
The issue was hotly debated in the House, and Republicans got an amendment to
a foreign aid bill that barred federal funds from being used for the United
Nations to monitor U.S. elections, The Associated Press reported.
In a letter dated July 30 and released last week, Assistant Secretary of State
Paul Kelly told the Democrats about the invitation to OSCE, without mentioning
the U.N. issue.
"I am pleased that Secretary Powell is as committed as I am to a fair and
democratic process," said Democratic Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas, who
spearheaded the effort to get U.N. observers.
"The presence of monitors will assure Americans that America cares about their
votes and it cares about its standing in the world," she said in a news
release.
Democratic Rep. Barbara Lee of California agreed.
"This represents a step in the right direction toward ensuring that this
year's elections are fair and transparent," she said.
"I am pleased that the State Department responded by acting on this need for
international monitors. We sincerely hope that the presence of the monitors
will make certain that every person's voice is heard, every person's vote is
counted."
OSCE, the world's largest regional security organization, will send a
preliminary mission to Washington in September to assess the size, scope,
logistics and cost of the mission, Gunnarsdottir said.
The organization, which counts among its missions conflict prevention and
postconflict rehabilitation, will then determine how many observers are
required and where in the United States they will be sent.
"OSCE-participating [nations] agreed in 1990 to observe elections in one
another's countries. The OSCE routinely monitors elections within its 55-state
membership, including Europe, Eurasia, Canada and the United States," a State
Department spokesman said.
The spokesman said the United States does not have any details on the size and
composition of the observers or what countries will provide them.
OSCE, based in Vienna, Austria, has sent more than 10,000 personnel to monitor
more than 150 elections and referenda in more than 30 countries during the
past decade, Gunnarsdottir said.
In November 2002, OSCE sent 10 observers on a weeklong mission to monitor the
U.S. midterm elections. OSCE also sent observers to monitor the California
gubernatorial recall election last year.
More recently, OSCE monitored the elections in Northern Ireland in November
and in Spain in March.
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/08/international.observers/
Fraud 'Key' Found?
He "accidently"got his hands on a copy of the Diebold software program--Diebold's source code--which runs their e-voting machines.
Dr. Rubin's students pored over 48,609 lines of code that make up
this software. One line in particular stood out over all the rest:
#defineDESKEY((des_KEY8F2654hd4"
All commercial programs have provisions to be encrypted so as to protect
them from having their contents read or changed by anyone not having the key.
The line that staggered the Hopkin's team was the method used to encrypt the
Diebold machines was a method called Digital Encryption Standard (DES), a code
that was broken in 1997 and is NO LONGER USED by anyone to secure
programs. F2654hd4 was the key to the encryption. Moreover, because the KEY was
IN the source code, all Diebold machines would respond to the same key. Unlock
one, you have then ALL unlocked.
By Gilbert Chan -- Bee Staff
Writer
Published 2:15 am PST Thursday, November 11, 2004
Diebold Inc. agreed to a $2.6 million settlement over allegations it sold the
state faulty touch-screen voting machines, Attorney General Bill Lockyer said
Wednesday.
State and county prosecutors had sued the Texas maker
of automated teller machines over allegations Diebold used bait-and-switch
tactics in selling unreliable electronic voting systems that lacked federal
and state certification and were vulnerable to computer hackers and software
bugs.
Under the proposed settlement, Diebold will pay about $1.6 million to the
state, $475,000 to Alameda County and $500,000 to the University of California
Institute of Governmental Studies. The institute will use the money to
research ways to train poll workers on electronic voting technology.
Diebold also will reimburse Alameda, Plumas, Kern, San Joaquin, San Diego and
Los Angeles counties for some of the costs to set up voting backup measures in
last week's general election.
http://www.sacbee.com/content/business/story/11385135p-12299466c.html
programmer_vote_rigging_florida.htm [Alternate link]
Interesting differences noted in exit poles where electronic votes used in place of paper ballot.
Video Supporting Ohio Vote Fraud Claim Revealed
t r u t h o u t | Report
Thursday 23 December 2004
Truthout has come into possession of video from Hocking County, Ohio. The
video was recorded by a documentary film crew that was reporting on the
Ohio election. The crew interviewed a technician from Triad Systems. In a
report released by truthout on December 15, 2004, we reported on an
affidavit filed by Sherole Eaton, Hocking County deputy director of
elections. In her affidavit, Eaton stated:
On Friday, December 10 2004, Michael from TriAd called in the AM to
inform us that he would be in our office in the PM on the same day. I asked
him why he was visiting us. He said, "to check out your tabulator,
computer, and that the attorneys will be asking some tricky questions and
he wanted to go over some of the questions they maybe ask." He also added
that there would be no charge for this service.
He arrived at about 12:30PM. I hung his coat up and it was very heavy. I
made a comment about it being so heavy. He, Lisa Schwartze and I chatted
for a few minutes. He proceeded to go to the room where our computer and
tabulation machine is kept. I followed him into the room. I had my back to
him when he turned the computer on. He stated that the computer was not
coming up. I did see some commands at the lower left hand of the screen but
no menu. He said that the battery in the computer was dead and that the
stored information was gone. He said that he could put a patch on it and
fix it. My main concern was - what if this happened when we were ready to
do the recount. He proceeded to take the computer apart and call his
offices to get information to input into our computer. Our computer is
fourteen years old and as far as I know had always worked in the past. I
asked him if the older computer, that is in the same room. could be used
for the recount. I don't remember exactly what he said but I did relay to
him that the computer was old and a spare. At some point he asked if he
could take the spare computer apart and I said "yes". He took both
computers apart. I don't remember seeing any tools and he asked Sue
Wallace, Clerk, for a screwdriver. She got it for him. At this point I was
frustrated about the computer not performing and feared that it wouldn't
work for the recount. I called Gerald Robinette, board chairman, to inform
him regarding the computer problem and asked him if we could have Tri Ad
come to our offices to run the program and tabulator for the recount.
Gerald talked on the phone with Michael and Michael assured Gerald that he
could fix our computer. He worked on the computer until about 3:00 PM and
then asked me which precinct and the number of the precinct we were going
to count. I told him, Good Hope 1 # 17. He went back into the tabulation
room. Shortly after that he (illegible) stated that the computer was ready
for the recount and told us not to turn the computer off so it would charge
up.
Before Lisa ran the tests, Michael said to turn the computer off. Lisa
said, " I thought you said we weren't supposed to turn it off." He said
turn it off and right back on and it should come up. It did come up and
Lisa ran the tests. Michael gave us instructions on how to explain the
rotarien, what the tests mean, etc. No advice on how to handle the
attorneys but to have our Prosecuting Attorney at the recount to answer any
of their legal questions. He said not to turn the computer off until after
the recount.
He advised Lisa and I on how to post a "cheat sheet" on the wall so that
only the board members and staff would know about it and and what the codes
meant so the count would come out perfect and we wouldn't have to do a full
hand recount of the county. He left about 5:00 PM.
My faith in Tri Ad and the Xenia staff has been nothing but good. The
realization that this company and staff would do anything to dishonor or
disrupt the voting process is distressing to me and hard to believe. I'm
being completely objective about the above statements and the reason I'm
bringing this forward is to, hopefully, rule out any wrongdoing.
The video of the technician buttresses her claims, and further reveals
that the Triad representative acted in the same manner in several other
counties besides Hocking.
The revelation of this video has motivated Rep. John Conyers, ranking
minority member of the House Judiciary Committee, to post a letter to Brett
Rapp, President of Triad Systems. In the letter, Conyers states:
I have just reviewed a tape prepared by the documentarian Lynda Byrket
of the hearing held by the Hocking County Board of Elections on December
20, and based on that tape I have more questions and concerns than ever
about the conduct of your firm in connection with the Ohio presidential
election and recount. In particular, I am concerned that your company has
operated - either intentionally or negligently - in a manner which will
thwart the recount law in Ohio by preventing validly cast ballots in the
presidential election from being counted.
You have done this by preparing "cheat sheets" providing county
election officials with information such that they would more easily be
able to ignore valid ballots that were thrown out by the machines during
the initial count. The purpose of the Ohio recount law is to randomly check
vote counts to see if they match machine counts. By attempting to ascertain
the precinct to be recounted in advance, and than informing the election
officials of the number of votes they need to count by hand to make sure it
matches the machine count is an invitation to completely ignore the purpose
of the recount law.
The mounting evidence of election tampering by Triad representatives has
motivated 2004 Presidential candidate John Kerry to join with Green Party
and Libertarian Party representatives in their Ohio recount effort. John
Kerry will file today, in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, papers in support of the Green Party/Libertarian Party
recount effort. Specifically, Kerry will be filing a request for expedited
discovery regarding Triad Systems voting machines, as well as a motion for
a preservation order to protect any and all discovery and preserve any
evidence on this matter.
http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/122404X.shtml
Maryland House votes to oust Diebold machines
MARCH 10, 2006 (COMPUTERWORLD) -
The state of Maryland stands poised to put its entire $90 million investment in Diebold Election Systems Inc. touch-screen e-voting
systems on ice because they can't produce paper receipts.
The state House of Delegates this week voted 137-0 to approve a bill
prohibiting election officials from using AccuVote-TSx touch-screen
systems in 2006 primary and general elections.
The legislation calls for the state to lease paper-based optical-scan
systems for this year's votes.
State Delegate Anne Healey estimated the leasing cost at $12.5 million
to $16 million for the two elections.
Healey is the vice chairwoman of the Maryland House Ways and Means
Committee, which recommended the passage of the bill.
The bill was sent onto the State Senate for a vote after the House action, she said.
Healey said the effort was inspired in part by concerns raised by officials in California and Florida that the Diebold systems have inherent security problems caused by technological and procedural flaws.
"We've been hearing from the public for the last several years that it doesn't have confidence in a system without a paper trail," Healey said.
"We need to provide that level of confidence going forward."
If the bill becomes law, the state's Diebold systems will be placed in "abeyance" and the vendor will be required to equip them so that they provide the requisite paper trail, she said.
Healey said the law would require that the machines provide a paper trail before the 2008 elections or Diebold would risk losing its contract with the state.
The bill also requires that any leased optical-scan system be equipped
to accommodate the needs of handicapped voters, to ensure compliance with the federal Help America Vote Act statutes.
http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/legislation/story/0,10801,109436,00.html
HACKED! High Tech Election Theft in America
Bhutto had "proof" state rigging poll - Simon Gardner Reuters
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
Benazir Bhutto was poised to reveal proof that Pakistan's election
commission and shadowy spy agency were seeking to rig an upcoming general
election the night she was assassinated, a top aide said on Tuesday.
Senator Latif Khosa, who authored a 160-page dossier with Bhutto documenting
rigging tactics, said they ranged from intimidation to fake ballots, and
were in some cases unwittingly funded by U.S. aid.
Bhutto had been due to give the report to two visiting U.S. lawmakers over
dinner on December 27, the day she was killed in a suicide bombing.
Bush predicts GOP will hold White House [2008] - AP, February 26, 2008
Cyber Security Expert: Hackers Planning To Steal Election For McCain - Sept 30/08
Spoonamore says electronic voting machines represent national security threat,
Israel, China and Russia have capability to rig presidential outcome
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