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Bush, Blair and the Osama Tapes
If the Moon could talk, what would it say?
by Maher Osseiran

  

 www.globalresearch.ca  5 May 2005

The URL of this article is: http://globalresearch.ca/articles/OSS505A.html

  While the controversy in England about the advice of the Attorney General on the legality of the Iraq war rages on and fuels requests for its publication in full, in America, George W. Bush is luckier and has survived the Valerie Plame issue, WMD’s, and the scathing report on the failure of intelligence prior to 9/11, the question is, how would both deal with the issue brought up in this article that potentially dwarfs all other issues.

  The issue is Bin Laden confessionals to his guilt of 9/11 on video tapes; yes plural, it is not a typo. One British supposedly acquired through intelligence, and one American explained as the product of an amateur videographer. Could those two tapes be just one and could it be as reported by the Observer the “result of a sophisticated sting operation”?

  We have all seen the “American video”, a video tape acquired by US soldiers in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and, provided by the Pentagon to the media and the general public in its raw form after intelligence services dissected it, analyzed it, and authenticated it. On the tape aired Dec 13, 2001, Osama Bin Laden, through a conversation with a visiting sheikh, later identified as Khaled al-Harbi , admits to 9/11, or in the least shows prior knowledge of it.

  Many of you might have forgotten or never even heard that there is also a “British video”. On Nov. 14, 2001 , Tony Blair addressed parliament and informed the audience that the British Government published transcript excerpts of the “video” in which it says Bin Laden admitted taking his campaign to the United States. The article quotes bin Laden as saying:

      "It is what we instigated for a while, in self-defence. If avenging the killing of our people is terrorism, let history be a witness that we are terrorists. The battle has been moved inside America, and we shall continue until we win this battle, or die in the cause and meet our maker."

  Now since Jalalabad fell on Nov. 14, the same day Mr. Blair uttered that quote in parliament, and, the president of the United States first exposure to the “American video” recovered in Jalalabad was not until Nov. 29, one has to assume that the “video” Mr. Blair is referring to is a different “video”. After all, if it is the same “video”, how could Mr. Blair have knowledge of something that has not yet existed?

  On Nov 11 , The British video makes it debut introduce by David Bamber of the Sunday Telegraph in London. Mr. Bamber informs us that the Telegraph had access to it and reports it this way:

    "The footage, to which the Telegraph obtained access in the Middle East yesterday, was not made for public release via the al-Jazeera television network used by bin Laden for propaganda purposes in the past. It is believed to be intended as a rallying call to al-Qa'eda members. He also tells us: “The video will form the centrepiece of Britain and America's new evidence against bin Laden, to be released this Wednesday.”

  On Nov 14 , three days later, the tape commits a disappearing act and this is how T.R. Reid, the Washington Post Foreign Service correspondent, reports from London on its official introduction in Parliament by Tony Blair; he writes: "The British government did not release the video or a full transcript, saying it does not have a copy of the video but has information about it from intelligence sources." In the same article, he also reports that there was an interviewer on the tape.

  Now you see it, now you don't !!!

  This is how the Washington Post describes on Dec. 9 Mr. Blair’s video in the article that unveiled the “American video” and I quote:

    “The new videotape is not the one described last month by British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Intelligence sources had obtained only a transcript of that tape, not the actual video.”

  It is a fact that the “British video” Tony Blair referred to on Nov 14, has never been provided to the public and his quotes of Nov 14, which are hearsay, are nowhere in the transcript of the “American video” recovered in Jalalabad and aired on Dec. 13, 2001. It is also a fact that through the various newspaper reports, we are asked to believe that only the Telegraph had access to the video while British and American intelligence had no chance to see it, vet it, or authenticate its transcript. Also, we are asked to believe that there are two “videos”, and that confessionals by “video” are a standard Osama Bin Laden business practice with copies distributed to heads of state.

  Logic dictates that we not believe, and dictates that we ask Tony Blair and the Telegraph, to release the video immediately. Also, since the analysis that follows increases the credibility of a report that the tape is the result of a sophisticated sting operation run by intelligence services, urgency is warranted.

  The following came to light while I was researching inconsistencies in intelligence that sent us to war in Iraq. The “American video” released by the Pentagon, even though not specifically related to the war in Iraq, stayed in my mind ever since it was aired and warranted a revisit as part of my research.

  While viewing the “American video”, both historic and technical inconsistencies were found. Granted, the tape is the most analyzed tape in the world, still, most of the analysis was centered on the looks of Bin Laden, his voice quality, his words, and none reported an investigative analysis that considered post-taping edits. Due to limited technical capabilities, we could only report that the tape was a fourth generation edit (copy or otherwise), that there are both VHS and digital drops on the tape, which is unusual, and that there was unwarranted editing that might have happened post-taping. Also, and most importantly, that certain camera angles and motions seemed too similar to a hat camera that football umpires wear. Those who are better equipped to conduct further evaluation are encouraged to do so. (click here for hints to those interested in conducting further technical analysis)

  In terms of the historic inconsistencies, the timeline inconsistencies that follow are of a serious nature and clear enough that the Pentagon analysts should have easily picked them out. The failure to detect them and report them should weigh negatively against those who released the video.

  The first anchor for the timeline analysis is what Ari Fleischer, the White House press secretary, informed us through his press briefings. Mr. Fleischer told us that the tape was found in Jalalabad, in an abandoned house, that the tape did not seem to be planted, and that the occupiers of the house seem to have left in a hurry. Mr. Fleischer also tells us that the tape seems to have been made on November 9, 2001, since that is what the time stamp on it is. He also goes on to say in one of his answers: “I can tell you, the President was first informed of it on November 29th.  He first viewed portions of it on November 30th.” Again, for the record, Jalalabad fell on Nov. 14.

  Now let us use the transcript of the tape that the Pentagon provided.

  In the transcript, the visiting sheikh to whom Bin Laden confessed is reported to have said:

    “We came from Kabul….. We asked the driver to take us, it was a night with a full moon, thanks be to Allah.”

  On the tape itself, the sheikh actually infers prominent moon, which I interpret as 3 to 4 days before and after a full moon. He is later reported to have said:

     “Allah has bestowed on us...honor on us...and he will give us blessing and more victory during this holy month of Ramadan.”

  In the tape he never uses the word Ramadan, he actually says: ”…….victory during this Moubarak (meaning blessed) month and the month after.”

  The translators decided to interpret “Moubarak month” as Ramadan since the word Moubarak is usually used to describe the month of Ramadan and totally omitted the fact that he said: “and the month after”.

  If Ramadan were the month the taping took place, Ramadan in 2001 starts like every other Ramadan with a new moon, as black as the night can get, and was on Nov. 16, while a full moon is not until Nov. 30, which means a prominent moon is between Nov. 26 and Dec. 4. The taping could not have happened during a prominent moon in the month of Ramadan since Kabul, the town the sheikh traveled through, had fallen on Nov. 12, Jalalabad, where it was found, on Nov.14, and Kandahar, where supposedly it was taped, was surrounded by anti-Taliban forces during that period and fell towards the end of it.

  Now that we have established that the taping could not have taken place during Ramadan and that the reported date stamp of Nov. 9 on the tape could have been a programming error on the part of the camera operator, we need to go back in time and examine the previous periods of a prominent moon which are: Oct. 27 through Nov. 4, and, Sept. 28 through Oct. 6.

  Going back to the transcript released by the Pentagon we find no mention of carpet bombings, coalition operations, or travel difficulties due to the military operations that officially started on Oct 6, 2001. I find it incredible that, over a period of 40 minutes of tape, there was no mention of military activities by the coalition or their effects on travel, considering the magnitude of such activities and the chattiness of the sheikh, which puts the period of Oct. 27 through Nov. 4 in doubt.

  The second anchors for the timeline analysis are statements by Tony Blair, that of Nov. 14 and the following two:

  On Oct 4, 2001 , in a speech, he states that a Government document is to be released and I quote the document:

    “There is evidence of a very specific nature relating to the guilt of Bin Laden and his associates that is too sensitive to release.” The operative words are “very specific”.

  On Sept. 30, 2001 , in a BBC interview, Tony Blair states that he has evidence from intelligence services of Bin Laden’s guilt and that the evidence was "powerful and incontrovertible". I had to look up incontrovertible in the dictionary, it means; not open to question or dispute; indisputable, as in, absolute and incontrovertible truth. This was only 4 days prior to Oct. 4, is he talking about the same “very specific” evidence. Very likely as it takes governments about 4 days to vet and publish.

  When we combine all three statements, we can deduce that the incontrovertible evidence was available as early as Sept. 30, that it was acquired by intelligence, and that it is a “video” since the only incontrovertible evidence, even though hearsay, Blair put forth was his quote of Nov. 14.

  Again, logic dictates that we ask Tony Blair to release his video.

  Going back to the timeline analysis. If we now take the period of Sept. 28 through Oct. 6, into consideration, we have to consider a fact that strongly favors this period, it is the fact that the visiting sheikh is a paraplegic and needs considerable help during travel. I would think a handicapped person would travel into Afghanistan during the relative calm of this period while he could still get the support and cooperation of the Taliban in his trek to locate and meet Bin Laden. Oddly enough, this time period also fits perfectly with Tony Blair’s statements of Sept. 30 and Oct. 4 and begs the conclusion that the video was produced around Sept. 28.

  The only inconsistency with the Sept. 28 through Oct. 6 period is where Ramadan is deduced by the translators but never mentioned by name by the sheikh. Again, let us review what the sheikh said: “…….victory during this Moubarak month and the month after.” One can wonder if his usage of the word Moubarak was strictly out of piety, if it is, then there is no inconsistency. But, since the mention of the prominent moon in the video was a normal statement and stating a fact that should be known to all present, giving it more prominence as the truth, and the use of the word Moubarak is not only proven out of chronological context but would also have raised eye brows if he had not followed it with “and the month after”, one has to consider the possibility that the word Moubarak was inserted intentionally, which adds credibility to the following paragraph.

  Ed Voliami and Jason Burke reported in the Observer on December 16, 2001 and I quote:

    “This weekend, as the debate the tape has provoked continued across the Islamic world, several intelligence sources have suggested to The Observer that the tape, although absolutely genuine, is the result of a sophisticated sting operation run by the CIA through a second intelligence service, possibly Saudi or Pakistani.”

  If Voliami and Burke are correct in their reporting, and our timeline on target, the sting operation that did the taping of the video could have been the sting operation that did the capturing or elimination of Bin Laden which would also have averted the Afghanistan war and significantly contained terrorism, not to mention preventing the loss of life on both sides.

  Another very serious consequence of airing a tape that is a product of a sting operation is the effect it would have on its subject, Bin Laden, when viewing it. By airing it, the producers of the tape tipped their hand and exposed the fact that they were mere feet from him; his paranoia and security concerns could only have increased and made him harder to locate.

  Considering all these serious questions that have been raised, strictly through the use of logic and public domain information, it is imperative that we ask Tony Blair and the Telegraph to release their tape.

  The implications that arise if both tapes, American and British, are the same are beyond comprehension, and the words needed to comfort those who have lost loved ones in 9/11 and in the war or terror are beyond imagination.

  If only the moon could talk!


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It's clear. The case for war was cooked up
The vast majority of Labour MPs failed Parliament when they didn't back a fresh inquiry into Blair's manipulation of the case for the invasion of Iraq

Henry Porter London Observer Sunday, November 5, 2006

Last Wednesday's melancholy defeat of the vote to hold a parliamentary inquiry into the Iraq war produced a brief roll of honour from the Labour benches. They are Harry Cohen, Jeremy Corbyn, Mark Fisher, Glenda Jackson, Roger Godsiff, John McDonnell, Alan Simpson, Peter Soulsby, Bob Marshall Andrews, Gavin Strang, Robert Wareing and Mike Wood.
They are the few. They voted against their party, but for parliament and democracy.

A mere dozen among 356 Labour members, they were the only ones on the government side not to fall for the phony argument that a parliamentary inquiry would undermine our troops in southern Iraq. They also knew that not one of the inquiries into Iraq so often cited by the government has got anywhere close to the facts of how Tony Blair deployed the government machine to take us to war.

This subject is not just a legitimate issue for Parliament to investigate but, as Fisher said, it is imperative for MPs to scrutinise the executive and hold it to account. 'If we fail to fulfil those responsibilities in relation to the Iraq war,' he said during the debate, 'we shall further deepen the growing and worrying imbalance between Parliament and the executive.'

The point about the inquiries held so far is that they have been narrow and flawed in their remits. The information leaked subsequent to their reports prove that they have missed the point or purposefully ignored or obscured it.

Take the Butler Review of Intelligence on WMD. Two weeks ago, I reminded readers of the contents of the Downing Street memo, which, in effect, was a minute of a meeting held at Downing Street on 23 July 2002. It described a visit to Washington by Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6, and his conclusion that George W Bush wanted to remove Saddam through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD and that the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.

A report of that meeting appears in Butler, but nowhere is the memo mentioned, even though I now understand that Lord Butler's committee of four privy councillors saw the memo and understood its significance. How was such damning evidence put to one side? The answer seems to be that the head of MI6's report on the thinking in Washington was not regarded as relevant to a review of British intelligence on weapons of mass destruction.

In the light of all we know now, that decision becomes increasingly hard to understand. The American case for war was replicated in Britain. Sir Richard Dearlove's report to that meeting is a key to the mood of, and influences working on, the Prime Minister at that time. For many, it is still surprising that as early as 23 July 2002, nine months before the invasion, the planning for war was so advanced in both countries

New information passed to this paper suggests that the construction of the intelligence case for war may be pushed right back to the winter of 2002, when, in February, members of the Joint Intelligence Committee were tasked to find out if there was evidence of a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam's regime in Iraq. No one can dispute that in the months following 9/11, this was an entirely proper area of inquiry for the new head of the JIC, John Scarlett. However, even though no evidence had been found, the JIC instructed the intelligence services to go back and find some. This is crucial because it defied what has been described to me as the article of faith in the JIC: that policy should be driven by analysis, not the other way round.

So in Britain, it appears that at a very early stage - 14 months before the war - we were trying to fit intelligence and facts around the policy, just as they were in America. This will not be news to people working with the JIC that year. In the spring of 2002, one individual I have interviewed recalls that he was asked about WMD and Iraq. His interlocutor said: 'There's not much intelligence on that, is there?' He replied that no, there wasn't. 'Oh, they're not going to like that,' said the man at the JIC.

Though one always thinks of Lord Butler as being honest and diligent, the exclusion of the information concerning Saddam and al-Qaeda is very difficult to understand. His report covers assessments by the JIC from before 2002. The possibility that the JIC was tasking agencies to find intelligence to fit policy is surely relevant, even central, to the purpose of his inquiry.

It could be argued that in February, the JIC was simply seeking evidence of Saddam's relationship with al-Qaeda (which, by the way, was always extremely unlikely) and that this was not strictly relevant to the narrow subject of Butler's inquiry into WMD. But you would be hard-pressed to maintain that line in front of a committee of our more astute MPs.

Even if you give Butler the benefit of the doubt on this, it is impossible to do so on the Iraq Options paper, a document produced by the Overseas and Defence Secretariat at the cabinet office on 8 March 2002. Again, the Butler committee adheres to the convenient limitations of its brief. So, no mention of the different war options elaborated in the paper, no mention of the passage on regime change and, crucially, nothing on the legal considerations of going to war which are so clearly laid out. Butler says that he covers this in another section of the report, but this isn't true. Nowhere will you find the following bald assessment that appears in the Iraq Options paper.

'In the judgment of the JIC, there is no recent evidence of Iraq complicity with international terrorism. There is, therefore, no justification for action against Iraq based on self-defence to combat imminent threats of terrorism as in Afghanistan.'

This is important because it confirms that the JIC had been trawling to make a connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda. MI6 could not find the evidence after repeated requests and was not prepared to make up intelligence to fit policy. So the government had to put all its effort into making the case for war solely on the basis of Saddam's stockpile of WMD, where it was much easier to make the intelligence and facts fit around policy.

Read the Iraq Options paper alongside Butler's version and you see how much has been left out. The paper has been diluted into inconsequence, yet the original version is a potent description of official activity and thinking. If you had read it in March 2002, you would have had no doubt about where we were heading.

Butler has said privately that his report was either misread or not properly understood by the media; that it was a much more potent criticism of the government than we believed. That is not tenable. Too much has been left out or defanged for that to be true. We only know this now because of leaks of documents and the people who have contacted me in response to my first column on this subject two weeks ago. Think how many more lies are waiting to be discovered by committee MPs charged with looking into every aspect of the path to war. Owing to the mass of Labour backbenchers, we are not going to get that inquiry any time soon. But we cannot leave it at that. The forthcoming issue of Vanity Fair reveals that now, even America's neocons, who were among the architects of the Iraq project, are reconsidering the events that led to war. We should do the same - and for that we need the evidence. My mail boxes of both kinds remain open.

 

 Battle over 'secret' Iraq dossier

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