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This is reported to be a timeline taken from statements made at the 911 commission, which many criticise as an "incomplete and half-hearted" effort to discern the truth.

 

Source: http://www.cooperativeresearch.org [Links are boxed in below text]

 

(6:30 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

       Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins and other NORAD employees at NEADS (NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector that covers the Washington and New York areas) are starting their work day. NORAD is unusually prepared on 9/11, because it is conducting a week-long semi-annual exercise called Vigilant Guardian. [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] Deskins is regional Mission Crew Chief for the Vigilant Guardian exercise. [ABC News, 9/11/02] The exercise poses “an imaginary crisis to North American Air Defense outposts nationwide.” [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] Accounts by participants vary on whether 9/11 was the second, third, or fourth day of the exercise. [Newhouse News, 1/25/02, Ottawa Citizen, 9/11/02, Code One Magazine, 1/02] NORAD is also running another fighter exercise named Operation Northern Vigilance (see (9:00 a.m.). NORAD is thus fully staffed and alert, and senior officers are manning stations throughout the US. The entire chain of command is in place and ready when the first hijacking is reported. An article later says, “In retrospect, the exercise would prove to be a serendipitous enabler of a rapid military response to terrorist attacks on Sept. 11.” [ Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, Bergen Record, 12/5/03 ] ABC News later reports that because NORAD is “conducting training exercises [it] therefore [has] extra fighter planes on alert.” [ABC News, 9/14/02] Colonel Robert Marr, in charge of NEADS, says, “We had the fighters with a little more gas on board. A few more weapons on board.” [ABC News, 9/11/02] However, Deskins and other NORAD officials later are initially confused whether the 9/11 attacks are real or part of the exercise (see 8:31 a.m.) There is a National Reconnaissance Office exercise occurring as well, involving a scenario of an airplane as a flying weapon (see 9:00 a.m.)).
 		           

(8:24 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

       Boston flight control radar sees Flight 11 making an unplanned 100-degree turn to the south (they're already way off-course). Flight controllers say they never lost sight of the flight, though they could no longer determine altitude once the transponder was turned off. [8:24, MSNBC, 9/11/02 (B), 8:28, Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01] Before this turn, the FAA had tagged Flight 11's radar dot for easy visibility, and at American Airlines headquarters at least, “All eyes watched as the plane headed south. On the screen, the plane showed a squiggly line after its turn near Albany, then it straightened.” [Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01] “Boston Center could still track it on primary radar ….” [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] Boston flight controller Mark Hodgkins later says, “I watched the target of American 11 the whole way down.” [ABC, 9/6/02] Reports stating that Boston's controllers don't spot the plane's course until just before or just after it has crashed appear to be incorrect (for instance, Washington Post, 9/12/01 and Newsday, 9/10/02). But apparently NEADS has different radar, and even around 8:40 they cannot find Flight 11. Boston has to periodically update NEADS on Flight 11's position by telephone until NEADS finally finds it a few minutes before it crashes into the WTC. [Aviation Week and Space Technology 6/3/02; ABC News 9/11/02; Newhouse News 1/25/02]
 		           

(8:37 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

      
NORAD commander Larry Arnold.

According to the 9/11 Commission, Boston flight control contacts NEADS (NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector) at this time. This is apparently the first successful notification of the military about the crisis that morning. Tech. Sgt. Jeremy Powell, a member of the Air National Guard at NEADS, initially takes the call from Boston Center. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, Newhouse News, 1/25/02] Boston flight control says, “Hi. Boston Center TMU, we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out.” Powell replies, “Is this real-world or exercise?” Boston answers, “No, this is not an exercise, not a test.” [8:37:52, 9/11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, BBC, 9/1/02] Powell gives the phone to Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins, regional Mission Crew Chief for the Vigilant Guardian exercise (see (6:30 a.m.)). Deskins later says that initially she and “everybody” else at NEADS thinks the call is part of Vigilant Guardian. After the phone call she has to clarify to everyone that it is not a drill. [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] NORAD commander Major General Larry Arnold in Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, also says that when he hears of the hijacking at this time, “The first thing that went through my mind was, is this part of the exercise? Is this some kind of a screw-up?” [ABC News, 9/11/02] Deskins recalls, “I picked up the line and I identified myself to the Boston Center controller, and he said, we have a hijacked aircraft and I need to get you some sort of fighters out here to help us out.” However, the timing of this vital notification is in some dispute. Deskins herself claimed the call occurred at 8:31. [ABC News, 9/11/02] Another report later states, “Shortly after 8:30 a.m., behind the scenes, word of a possible hijacking [reaches] various stations of NORAD.” [ABC News, 9/14/02] FAA Administrator Jane Garvey testified in 2003 that the FAA notified NORAD at 8:34. [New York Times, 12/30/03] NORAD on the other hand, originally claimed they were first notified at 8:40, and this was widely reported in the media prior to the 9/11 Commission's report. [8:40, NORAD, 9/18/01, 8:40, AP, 8/19/02, 8:40, BBC, 9/1/02, 8:40, Newsday, 9/10/02] If the 8:37 time is accurate, this means flight controllers don't notify NORAD until 24 minutes after radio contact is lost (see (8:13 a.m.)), about 17 minutes after the transponder signal is lost and the flight goes far off course (see (Between 8:13- 8:21 a.m.)and(8:20 a.m.), and 13 minutes after voices of the hijackers in the cockpit remove any doubt the plane has been hijacked (see (8:24 a.m.)).
 

           

(After 8:37 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

       NORAD gives the command to scramble fighters after Flight 11 after being notified (see (8:37 a.m.)). Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins at NEADS tells Colonel Robert Marr, head of NEADS, “I have FAA on the phone, the shout line, Boston Center. They said they have a hijacked aircraft.” Marr then calls Major General Larry Arnold at NORAD's command Center in Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, and says, “Boss, I need to scramble [fighters at] Otis [Air National Guard Base].” Arnold recalls, “I said go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get the authorities later.” Arnold then calls NORAD headquarters to report. [ABC News, 9/11/02, Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] Then, seeing the proper authorization, NEADS calls Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek at NORAD's Colorado headquarters. Jellinek is sitting near Canadian Air Force Major General Rick Findley, director of combat operations there. Findley's staff is “already on high alert” because of a joint US-Canada exercise known as Vigilant Guardian (see (6:30 a.m.)), and another joint exercise known as Operation Northern Vigilance (see (9:00 a.m.)). Jellinek gets the thumbs up authorization from Findley to send fighters after Flight 11. Findley later states, “At that point all we thought was we've got an airplane hijacked and we were going to provide an escort as requested. We certainly didn't know it was going to play out as it did.” Findley remains in charge of NORAD headquarters while his staff feeds information to NORAD commander-in-chief Ralph Eberhart stationed in Florida. [CBC 11/27/01; Toronto Star 12/9/01; Ottawa Citizen 9/11/02; Aviation Week and Space Technology 6/3/02]
 		           

(8:40 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

       Major Daniel Nash (codenamed Nasty) and Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy (codenamed Duff) are the two F-15 pilots who would scramble after Flight 11 and then Flight 175. Apparently they get several informal calls warning to get ready. Nash says that at this time, a colleague at the Otis Air National Guard Base tells him that a flight out of Boston has been hijacked, and to be on alert. [Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02] NEADS senior technician Jeremy Powell, told about the hijacking at 8:37 (see (8:37 a.m.)), says that he telephones Otis Air Base at some point after that and tells it to upgrade its “readiness posture.” [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] Robert Marr, head of NEADS, also says that after being told of the hijacking at 8:37, he says, “I'll call 1st Air Force [at Otis] and let them know we've got a potential incident.” [BBC, 9/1/02] Boston flight control tried calling the Otis base directly at 8:34, though the result of that call remains unclear (see 8:34 a.m.). Duffy recalls being warned: “I was just standing up by the ops desk and I was told I had a phone call. I asked who it was and they said the [Boston] Tower calling and something about a hijacking. It was Flight American 11, a 767, out of Boston going to California. At the time we ran in and got suited up.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, BBC, 9/1/02, Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02] Duffy says, “Halfway to the jets, we got ‘battle stations’ … ” which means to get ready for action. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] The actual scramble order doesn't come until they're already waiting in the fighters: “We went out, we hopped in the jets and we were ready to go—standby for a scramble order if we were going to get one.” [BBC, 9/1/02] Duffy continues, “I briefed Nasty on the information I had about the American Airlines flight. About 4-5 minutes later, we got the scramble order and took off.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] However, the official notification to scramble these fighters doesn't come until 8:46. The six or more minute delay between unofficial and official notification has not been explained (see (8:46 a.m.)).
 		           

8:43 a.m.      Complete 911 Timeline

       NORAD is notified that Flight 175 has been hijacked. [8:43, NORAD, 9/18/01, 8:43, CNN, 9/17/01, 8:43, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 8:43, AP, 8/19/02, 8:43, Newsday, 9/10/02] Apparently NORAD doesn't need to be notified, because by this time NEADS technicians have their headsets linked to the FAA in Boston to hear about Flight 11, and so NORAD learns instantly about Flight 175. [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] Note that this means the controllers working Flight 77 and Flight 93 would have been aware of both Flight 175 and Flight 11's hijacking from this time.
 		           

(10:13-10:23 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

       The 9/11 Commission later concludes that had Flight 93 not crashed, it would probably reach Washington around this time. The commission notes that there are only three fighters over Washington at this time, all from Langley, Virginia. But the pilots of these fighters were never briefed about why they were scrambled. As the lead pilot explained, “I reverted to the Russian threat … I'm thinking cruise missile threat from the sea. You know you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one by us …. [Y]ou couldn't see any airplanes, and no one told us anything.” The pilots knew their mission was to identify and divert aircraft flying within a certain radius of Washington, but didn't know that the threat came from hijacked planes. Also, the Commission notes that NEADS didn't know where Flight 93 was when it crashed, and wonders if they would have determined its location and passed it on the pilots before the plane reached Washington. They conclude, “NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted and shot down United 93. We are not so sure.” [Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] It is not even completely certain if fighters reach Washington before Flight 93 would have (see(9:55-10:10 a.m.)).
 		           

(After 9:03 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

      
NEADS commander Robert Marr.

Shortly after the second WTC crash, calls from fighter units start “pouring into NORAD and sector operations centers, asking, ‘What can we do to help?’ ” At Syracuse, New York, an [Air National Guard] commander [tells NEADS commander Robert] Marr, “Give me 10 min. and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 min. and I'll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers [Amraams].” Marr replies, “I want it all.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] Supposedly, Marr says, “Get to the phones. Call every Air National Guard unit in the land. Prepare to put jets in the air. The nation is under attack.” [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] Canadian Major General Eric Findley, based in Colorado and in charge of NORAD that day, supposedly has his staff immediately order as many fighters in the air as possible. [Ottawa Citizen, 9/11/02] Yet another account says those calls don't take place until about an hour later: “By 10:01 a.m., the command center began calling several bases across the country for help.” [Toledo Blade, 12/9/01] The 9/11 Commission later concludes that a command for other bases to prepare fighters to scramble isn't given until 9:49 (see 9:49 a.m.). In fact, it appears the first fighters from other bases to take off are those from Syracuse at 10:44. This is over an hour and a half after Syracuse's initial offer to help, and not long after a general ban on all flights, including military ones, is lifted (see (9:26 a.m.) and (10:31 a.m.)). These are apparently the first fighters scrambled from the ground aside from three at Langley, two at Otis, and two Toledo, Ohio fighters ordered scrambled at 10:01 that launch fifteen minutes later (see 10:01 a.m.). [Toledo Blade 12/9/01]
 

           

(9:08-9:13 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

       The two F-15s sent to New York City to find Flight 11 are ordered to hover in a 150-mile chunk of air space off the coast of Long Island. There are contradictory accounts over whether they reach New York City before being directed over the ocean (see (9:08 -9:13 a.m.)). Pilot Major Daniel Nash states, “Neither the civilian controller or the military controller knew what they wanted us to do.” [Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02] At 9:09, the NEADS Mission Crew Commander learns of the second WTC crash, and decides to send the fighters to New York City. The 9/11 Commission says the fighters remain in a holding pattern over the ocean until 9:13 while the FAA clears the airspace. The fighters then establish a Combat Air Patrol over the city at 9:25. It's unclear what the fighters do between 9:13 and 9:25, as the distance between the two locations is unknown but presumably not large. [Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] These fighters remain over New York City for the next four hours. [Cape Cod Times 8/21/02]
 		           

(9:03 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

       The 9/11 Commission later concludes that New York flight control tells NEADS that Flight 175 has been hijacked at this time. The Commission calls this “the first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft.” [9/11 Commission Report, 6/17/04] Robert Marr, head of NEADS, claims that he only learns a flight other than Flight 11 has been hijacked by watching Flight 175 crash into the WTC on television. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] However, after 9/11, NORAD originally concluded they were notified about Flight 175 at 8:43 (see 8:43 a.m.). Additionally, as Flight 175 crashes into the WTC, Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek overseeing the command center in NORAD's Colorado headquarters is on the phone with NEADS. He sees this live on television and asks NEADS, “Was that the hijacked aircraft you were dealing with?” The reply is yes. [Toronto Star, 12/9/01] This contradicts the Commission's conclusion that NEADS has not yet been told about Flight 175. But even if the Commission's account is correct, Flight 175 lost radio contact at 8:42, changed transponder signals at 8:46 (see (8:46 a.m.)), a flight controller called it possibly hijacked at 8:46 and/or 8:53 (see 8:46 a.m. and 8:51-8:53 a.m.), and a flight control manager called it hijacked at 8:55 (see(8:55 a.m.)). The Commission has not explained why New York flight control would wait at least 10 and as many as 17 minutes before warning NORAD that Flight 175 is possibly hijacked. [Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] It would also mean that United Airlines headquarters fails to notify NORAD despite knowing the plane has been hijacked for about a dozen minutes (see (8:49 a.m.) and (8:50 a.m.)).
 		           

9:21 a.m.      Complete 911 Timeline

       According to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD's NEADS is contacted by Boston flight control. A controller says, “I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards—heading towards Washington …. That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That's the latest report we have …. I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.” The NEADS official asks, “He—American 11 is a hijack? … And he's heading into Washington?” The Boston controller answers yes both times and adds, “This could be a third aircraft.” Somehow Boston is told by FAA headquarters that Flight 11 is still airborne, but the Commission hasn't been able to find where this mistaken information came from. [Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]
 		           

9:23 a.m.      Complete 911 Timeline

       According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS has just been told that the hijacked Flight 11 is still in the air and heading toward Washington. The NEADS Battle Commander says, “Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he's heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.” The NEADS Mission Crew Commander issues the order, “Okay … scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area.” The Langley, Virginia base gets the scramble order at 9:24 (see (9:24 a.m.)). NEADS keeps their fighters from the Otis base over New York City. [9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04]
 		           

(9:24 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

       The BBC later reports that at this time, Robert Marr, head of NEADS, gives the scramble order to the F-16 fighters based in Langley, Virginia: “North East sectors back on. We ought to be getting the weapons crews back in. Get the scramble order rolling. Scramble.” [BBC, 9/1/02] The 9/11 Commission concurs that the scramble order is given now. [9/11 Commission Report, 6/17/04] NORAD also has agreed. [NORAD, 9/18/01] However, many media reports have placed it later (for instance: 9:27, CNN, 9/17/01, 9:25, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 9:35, CNN, 9/17/01, 9:35, Washington Post, 9/15/01). A pilot codenamed Honey gives a slightly different account. He claims that at this time a battle stations alert sounds, and two other pilots are given the order to climb into their F-16s and await further instructions. Then, Honey, who is the supervising pilot, talks to the two other pilots. Then, “five or ten minutes later,” a person from NORAD calls, and Honey speaks to him at the nearby administrative office. He is told that all three of them are ordered to scramble. Honey goes to his living quarters, grabs his flight gear, puts it on, runs to his plane, and takes off. [Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 64-65] Honey appears to be the codename for Captain Craig Borgstrom, because in another account it is Borgstrom who is given an alert and then talks to the two other pilots. [AP, 8/19/02 (C)] A different pilot account has the battle stations warning three minutes earlier (see 9:21 a.m.), while the 9/11 Commission claims that it happens fifteen minutes earlier (see 9:09 a.m.). Pilot Major Dean Eckmann recalls, “They go ‘active air scramble, vector zero one zero one, max speed'. And then I push us over to the tower frequency and get our departure clearance and they launch us out right away …. We can carry M9-Heat Seekers, Side Winders for the M7-Sparrow, plus we have an internal 20mm Vulcan Cannon, and we were pretty much armed with all that. We had a pretty quick response time. I believe it was four to five minutes we were airborne from that point.’ ” The BBC reports, “Even while last minute pre-launch checks are being made, the controllers learn that a third plane —American Airlines flight 77 out of Washington—may have been hijacked.” Just before the fighters take off, the BBC says, “The pilots get a signal over the plane's transponder—a code that indicates an emergency wartime situation.” [BBC 9/1/02]
 		           

(9:30 a.m.)      Complete 911 Timeline

       Flight controllers mistakenly suspect that Delta Flight 1989, flying west over Pennsylvania, has been hijacked. The controllers briefly suspect the sound of hijackers' voices in Flight 93 is coming from this plane, only a few miles away. USA Today reports the flight “joins a growing list of suspicious jets. Some of their flight numbers will be scrawled on a white dry-erase board throughout the morning” at FAA headquarters. Miscommunications lead to further suspicion of Flight 1989 even after the source of the hijacker's message is confirmed to come from Flight 93. Flight 1989 lands in Cleveland at 10:10. Eventually, about 11 flights will be suspected, with four of them actually hijacked. [USA Today, 8/13/02 (B)] The 9/11 Commission later has another explanation. They claim that at 9:41, Boston flight control identifies Flight 1989 as a possible hijacking strictly because it is a transcontinental 767 that had departed from Logan Airport. Although NEADS never loses track of the flight, it launches fighters from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it (see 10:01 a.m. and (After 10:06 a.m.)). [9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04]
 		           

9:34 a.m.      Complete 911 Timeline

       According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS contacts the FAA's Washington Center to ask about Flight 11. A manager there happens to mention, “We're looking—we also lost American 77.” The Commission claims, “No one at FAA Command Center or headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.” [Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] Yet, 38 minutes earlier, flight controllers determined Flight 77 was off course, out of radio contact, and had no transponder signal (see (8:56 a.m.)). They'd warned American Airlines headquarters within minutes (see (Before 9:00 a.m.)).
 		           

9:38 a.m.      Complete 911 Timeline

       Accounts differ as to how far the F-16 fighters scrambled from Langley are when Flight 77 crashes. The Langley, Virginia base is 129 miles from Washington. NORAD originally claimed that at the time of the crash the fighters are 105 miles away, despite having taken off seven minutes earlier. [NORAD, 9/18/01] The 9/11 Commission claims that at 9:36, NEADS discovers that Flight 77 is only a few miles from the White House and are discovered to find the fighters have headed east over the ocean (see (9:30-9:37 a.m.)). They are ordered to Washington immediately, but are still about 150 miles away. This is farther away than the base where they took off. [Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] The F-16 pilot codenamed Honey (who is apparently Captain Craig Borgstrom (see (9:24 a.m.))) offers a different explanation. He says they are flying toward New York, when they see a black column of smoke coming from Washington, about 30 or 40 miles to the west. He is then asked over the radio by NEADS if he can confirm the Pentagon is burning. He confirms it. The F-16s are then ordered to set up a defensive perimeter above Washington. [Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 76, New York Observer, 2/11/04] The maximum speed of an F-16 is 1500 mph. [AP, 6/16/00] Had the fighters traveled straight to Washington at 1300 mph, they would have reached Washington at least one minute before Flight 77.
 		           

10:07 a.m.      Complete 911 Timeline

       According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS receives a call from Cleveland flight control about Flight 93. Cleveland passes on the plane's last known latitude and longitude. NEADS is unable to locate it on radar because it has already crashed. [Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]
 		           

10:10 a.m.      Complete 911 Timeline

       According to the 9/11 Commission, The NEADS Mission Crew Commander is sorting out the orders Langley fighters have. Not knowing that Flight 93 had been heading toward Washington nor that it had crashed, he explicitly instructs the Langley fighters that they cannot shoot down aircraft—they have “negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over Washington. Authorization to shoot down hijacked civilian aircraft only reaches NEADS at 10:31, and even then it isn't passed on to the pilots (see 10:31 a.m.). [9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04]
 		           

10:15 a.m.      Complete 911 Timeline

       According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS calls Washington flight control. Asked about Flight 93, flight control responds, “He's down.” It is clarified that the plane crashed “somewhere up northeast of Camp David.” [9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04]
 		           

10:31 a.m.      Complete 911 Timeline

       According to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD commander Major General Larry Arnold instructs his staff to broadcast the following message over a NORAD chat log: “10:31 Vice President [Cheney] has cleared to us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond, per CONR CC [General Arnold].” NEADS first learns of the shoot down order from this message. However, NEADS doesn't pass the shoot down order to the fighter pilots in New York City and Washington. NEADS leaders later say they don't pass it on because they are unsure how to pilots should proceed with this guidance. [Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] The pilots flying over New York City claim they are never given a formal shoot down order that day (see (9:50 a.m.)).
 

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